Users can override the new default behavior in the usual way. The
expectation is that the build of BoringSSL they provide the feature set
implemented by the patch.
Per BoringSSL's FIPS policy, its `main` branch is the "update branch"
for FedRAMP compliance's purposes.
This means that we can stop using a specific BoringSSL branch when
enabling FIPS, as well as a number of hacks that allowed us to build
more recent BoringSSL versions with an older pre-compiled FIPS modules.
This also required slightly updating the main BoringSSL submodule, as
the previous version had an issue when building with the FIPS option
enabled. This is turn required some changes to the PQ patch as well as
some APIs that don't seem to be exposed publicly, as well as changing
some paths in the other patches.
In order to allow a smooth upgrade of internal projects, the `fips-compat`
feature is reduced in scope and renamed to `legacy-compat-deprecated` so
that we can incrementally upgrade internal BoringSSL forks. In practice
this shouldn't really be something anyone else would need, since in
order to work it requires a specific mix of BoringSSL version and
backported patches.
Newer versions of FIPS don't need any special casing in our bindings,
unlike the submoduled boringssl-fips. In addition, many users currently
use FIPS by precompiling BoringSSL with the proper build tools and
passing that in to the bindings.
Until we adopt the Update Stream pattern for FIPS, there are two main
use cases:
1. Passing an unmodified, precompiled FIPS validated version of
boringssl (fips-precompiled)
2. Passing a custom source directory of boringssl meant to be linked
with a FIPS validated bcm.o. This is mainly useful if you carry
custom patches but still want to use a FIPS validated BoringCrypto.
(fips-link-precompiled)
This commit introduces the `fips-precompiled` feature and removes the
`fips-no-compat` feature.
Modify the "fips" feature so that it no longer implies "fips-compat".
The latter is no longer needed for recent builds of boringSSL; users who
need older builds will need to enable "fips-compat" explicitly.
Also, remove the "fipps-no-compat" feature, as it's now equivalent to
"fips".
As of boringSSL commit a430310d6563c0734ddafca7731570dfb683dc19, we no
longer need to make exceptions for the types of BufLen, ProtosLen, and
ValueLen, which means the "fips-compat" feature is no longer needed for
"fips" users.
Currently "fips" implies "fips-compat". To allow users to upgrade
without breaking API compatibility with boring version 4, add a new
feature, "fips-no-compat", that does not imply "fips-compat".
In boring 5, we should remove "fips-no-compat" and decouple
"fips-compat" from "fips".
* RTG-3333 Support X25519MLKEM768 by default, but don't sent it as client
X25519MLKEM768 is the standardised successor of the preliminary
X25519Kyber768Draft00. Latest browsers have switched to X25519MLKEM768.
Cloudflare supports both on the edge.
We've had support for X25519MLKEM768 in this crate for a while, but
didn't enable by default. We're now enabling serverside support by
default. We also let clients advertise support when set
to kx-client-pq-supported.
We don't enable support by default yet for clients set to
kx-client-pq-preferred, as that would cause an extra round-trip due to
HelloRetryRequest if the server doesn't support X25519MLKEM768 yet.
BoringSSL against which we build must support X25519MLKEM768, otherwise
this will fail.
* replace once_cell with LazyLock
We can drop the once_cell dependency since the same functionality is
implemented in std now.
Requires bumping MSRV to 1.80.
* fix manual_c_str_literals clippy warning
---------
Co-authored-by: Bas Westerbaan <bas@cloudflare.com>
Co-authored-by: Alessandro Ghedini <alessandro@cloudflare.com>
It serves no purpose as there is no additional API in tokio-boring when
this feature is enabled, but there is a test gated by it and it can't
be conditionnally enabled only when boring's feature is enabled.
This helps drive async callbacks from outside tokio-boring, such as in quiche.
Not a breaking change because every public item in tokio-boring is preserved as is.
Setting callbacks multiple times on a SslContextBuilder causes the previous callback
installed to leak, using replace_ex_data internally prevents that.
We also start using it in tokio-boring in with_ex_data_future, my understanding
is that the futures currently in use are never installed twice by that function
but that could change in the future with the addition of more async callbacks.
We introduce new methods replace_ex_data for both SslContextBuilder
and Ssl in case anyone is relying on the leaking behaviour of their
set_ex_data methods, but we do document that they leak now.
This was an accidental regression in
d1ee9bfd86 which leads to pulling in the
full featureset of tokio and hyper for all dependents of tokio-boring
and hyper-boring.
Fixes#179.
Feature no-patches is ever only useful when setting other env variables
BORING_BSSL{,_FIPS}{,_SOURCE}_PATH, and it has no impact on the APIs
provided by any of the boring crates, so we may as well make it an env
variable itself so downstream users have less features to propagate
across their own crate graph.
Feature rpk in boring doesn't do anything unless you
explicitly use `SslAcceptor::rpk` or `SslContext::rpk_builder`,
and neither of these types are directly reachable if the
user depends only on tokio-boring or hyper-boring, which
means you still need to explicitly depend on the boring crate
to use RPK, in which case you can enable the feature there.
Builds using feature fips or fips-link-precompiled now
read variables prefixed by BORING_BSSL_FIPS_ instead of
BORING_BSSL_. This helps complex builds where build dependencies
also use boring, where we may not want to use fips there.
Without those separate variables, the boring build for the
build dependencies end up relying on e.g. BORING_BSSL_PATH,
causing errors if this path is a boring checkout intended for
fips builds, while the fips feature isn't enabled for
the build dependency.
These two new kinds of methods immediately return a MidHandshakeSslStream
instead of actually initiating a handshake. This greatly simplifies
loops around MidHandshakeSslStream::WouldBlock.
0x676e67